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Freedom of Conscience and the
Rights of Non-TOTFers
J6natas E. M. Machado*
Professor Michael Perry poses an interesting question in his
article, supra: To what extent can a country, such as the hypo-
thetical Elysium, intending to ensure eternal salvation to the
maximum number of citizens possible through "the one true faith"
(TOTF), create a legal regime that provides a strong incentive for
its citizens to follow the dictates of TOTF, while at the same time
remaining compatible with the basic tenets of religious freedom as
enshrined in international human rights law?' Professor Perry
notes that TOTF recognizes the inherent dignity of human beings,
and thus would not tolerate anything violative of this value. 2 The
Elysian State, therefore, has adopted a legal regime that attempts
to favor TOTF without compromising some of its basic tenets: (1)
no one would be coerced to accept TOTF; (2) no one would be re-
quired to support TOTF, financially or otherwise; (3) no one would
be prohibited from practicing non-TOTF religions privately; and
(4) no one would be allowed to promote non-TOTF religions.3 Pro-
fessor Perry's question is entirely relevant since there are several
establishments around the world that closely resemble his Ely-
sium. This "thought experiment" makes it possible for us to try to
identify some of the problems with the Elysian understanding of
religious freedom in light of the values and interests that this
fundamental right should aspire to promote and protect in free
* Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Coimbra, Coim-
bra, Portugal.
1. Michael Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom? The Universality of
Human Rights, The Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 385(2005).
2. Id. at401.
3. Id. at 401-06.
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and democratic constitutional order. In this author's view there
are good reasons why those of us who value human dignity and
fundamental rights should promote normative change in the Ely-
sian State.
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND COLLECTIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT
In a democratic society of free and equal citizens the State has
a duty to impart at least two privileges: first, to provide public
goods and correct market failures, leaving its citizens free to fully
debate all questions concerning the origin, meaning and destiny of
their lives; and second, to abstain from enforcing eternal salvation
to some segments of the popularion on the basis of religious as-
sumptions and doctrines held by other segments of that popula-
tion.4 In the case of the Elysian State, the possibility of religious
freedom for minorities is entirely dependent upon the assumptions
and doctrines of TOTF - the majority religion - which results in a
clear violation of the principle of equal religious freedom. It must
be stressed that religious freedom, to be fully effective, requires a
pre-commitment to equal freedom of conscience and popular sov-
ereignty.5
The Elysian State did not meet this requirement, since by
protecting only the devotio privata of non-TOTFers it significantly
limited the religious minorities' potential to live and communicate
with others in a manner consistent with their own consciences.
Thanks to the Elysian position on religious freedom, non-TOTFers
cannot publicly act on and speak about their most important con-
victions, those that matter more to them, and probably those that,
in their own opinion, should matter more to others. But the right
of religious freedom for TOTFers is also limited since they cannot
4. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18-19 (Prome-
theus Books 1990) (1689).
5. Locke states:
Our government has not only been partial in matters of religion, but
those also who have suffered under that partiality, and have there-
fore endeavored by their writings to vindicate their own rights and
liberties, have for the most part done it upon narrow principles,
suited only to the interests of their own sects .... But whatever
have been the occasions, it is now time to seek for a thorough
cure .... Absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial
liberty, is the thing that we stand in need of.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
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freely change their religion; such a decision would penalize both
their freedom and civic status should they decide do become non-
TOTFers. The end result, then, is that the dignity and autonomy
of TOTFers and non-TOTFers alike is violated, because they are
both severely limited in making some of their most important de-
cisions. On the other hand, by basing State action on TOTF and
placing TOTF above any challenge or discussion, the Elysian State
has compromised the Elysians' capacity for democratic communi-
cation and self-government. In a democratic government composed
of free and equal citizens, the State cannot commit itself to a reli-
gious doctrine even if it can accommodate the values and princi-
ples of the majority through open communication and the
democratic process.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND EXCLUSIVE THEOLOGIES
Exclusive theologies are not necessarily incompatible with in-
dividual freedom of conscience. It is entirely possible for a reli-
gious community to subscribe exclusively to a single theology and
yet abide by the principle of religious freedom. The history of reli-
gious freedom shows that many of its first defenders just wanted
the freedom to promote their own exclusive theologies;6 that was
why these groups defended the notion that it was inappropriate
for the State to settle theological disputes with coercive power.
The fact that TOTF adopts an exclusive theology, however, is nei-
ther an adequate reason for it to force others to embrace its teach-
ings, nor to attempt to capture the Elysian State as a coercive tool
over the people. In a free and democratic constitutional order it
should be possible for a religious community to affirm the princi-
ple "extra ecclesia nullam salus,"7 while at the same time respect-
ing the right of every individual to freely accept or reject this and
other religious doctrines. In fact, the essence of religious freedom
is precisely the capacity to make one's own decisions in matters of
religious doctrine.8 Every individual must have the right to ad-
6. E.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Foundations for Freedom of Conscience:
Stronger than You Might Think, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 359, 374-75
(2005).
7. "Outside the Church there is no salvation." CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH art. 9, 3, § 846.
8. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 19:
No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but
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here - or not - to any religious community, and to accept - or
not - its religious tenets, whether they be exclusive or inclusive.
The right of religious freedom is especially important where
there exists a dominant religious group with an exclusive theol-
ogy, as well as where there is a public confrontation between dif-
ferent exclusive religious doctrines. In a free and democratic
society, the fact that one group adheres to an exclusive theology is
not a strong enough ground to deny religious freedom to those who
reject that theology; likewise, the fact that one rejects exclusivist
theologies of salvation is not a sufficient reason to deny religious
freedom to those who hold exclusivist theologies. 9
Although some citizens of the Elysian State may reject the
truth claim of TOTF, it does not follow that there is sufficient
ground for the State to resort to coercion. First, the State has no
privileged access to religious truth.10 Second, even if it had, there
is no such thing as a legal duty to get saved. Considering the fact
that even the most exclusive theologies have changed over time, it
makes no sense to entrust the State with the power to enforce an
exclusive theology as if it had a privileged knowledge of a whole,
timeless truth. An open sphere of public discourse seems to be the
ideal forum to subject different exclusivist theological claims to
critical debate and cross-examination.
THE STATE AND THE OFFICIAL RELIGION
The existence of an official religion such as TOTF raises sev-
every one joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he be-
lieves he has found that profession and worship which is truly ac-
ceptable to God. For if afterwards he discovers anything erroneous in
the doctrine ... why should it not be as free for him to go out as it
was to enter?
Id.
9. Locke has asserted
that seeing one man does not violate the right of another, by his er-
roneous opinions, and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition
any prejudice to another man's affairs; therefore the care of each
man's salvation belongs only to himself .... Every man ... has the
supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself.., because
nobody else is concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his
conduct therein.
Id. at 57.
10. Id. at 19 (arguing that the power of the magistrate may never be "ex-
tended to the salvation of souls.").
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eral questions. One of them concerns the factors that led the State
to adopt certain religious tenets, such as orthodoxy. Another has
to do with the process observed in making that decision. As to the
first problem, there can be no impartial and objective way to as-
sert the truth of a religious doctrine as superior to competing
claims. The reality is that there are several religions with compet-
ing and antagonistic claims; this means that either some are truth
and others are false, or they are all false. They cannot all be truth
at the same time, since they often contradict each other (e.g., "Je-
sus is the Son of God" versus "Jesus was one among many human
prophets"). This, of course, does not preclude the real possibility
that some religious claims, despite their supernatural and meta-
rational elements, appear more plausible than others, from a theo-
logical, anthropological, historical and scientific perspective.
Thus a widely held conviction that a certain religion (e.g.,
Christianity, TOTF) is the true religion, if accepted, means that
others must be erroneous. If that religion is adopted by the State
without any evidence of its truth - whether proved beyond rea-
sonable doubt, or even a simple doubt - and is presented to all
citizens as definite truth without any opportunity for challenge
and debate, all those who are convinced (and think they have good
reasons to be) of the falsity of that religion would be prohibited
from publicly voicing their arguments. There are many historical
examples of minority religions whose doctrines have made lasting
contributions to the public good of political communities domi-
nated by one main religion, while at the same time contributing to
the rethinking and revision of even the most "true" and "infallible"
dogmas of dominant religions. 1 Without the presentation of evi-
dence and a meaningful opportunity for comment, the question of
the truth or falsity of the established religion is arbitrarily re-
11. For example, the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation in Europe
had an substantial impact upon the once dominant Catholic Church. The re-
ligious historian Hans King noted that the Reformation brought the Catholic
Church out of an "all too human ecclesiocentricity of a powerful church to the
christocentricity of the gospel, all under the sign of the freedom of the Chris-
tian." HANS KiNG, CHRISTIANITY: ESSENCE, HISTORY, AND FUTURE 644-45 (John
Bowden trans., Continuum Books 1995) (1994). Catholicism's struggle with
the Reformation culminated with the ground-breaking adoption of the Second
Vatican Council reforms through which the Catholic Church incorporated the
principle of ecclesia semper reformada, "[the] constant renewal of one's own
church in life and teaching according to the gospel .... " Id.
44320051
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moved from public debate.
The problem becomes even more acute when one acknowl-
edges that by endorsing a certain religion and by privatizing all
dissent to it, the State deprives its non-subscribing citizens of the
ability to publicly challenge religious doctrines that form the basis
of the State's power to enforce their political and legal subordina-
tion. Even when the State's decision to establish a religious doc-
trine does not appear to be arbitrary, but instead seems to be
based on circumstantial evidence - the ability of which to with-
stand the test of time suggests the plausibility of its truth claims
(e.g., evidence of design in nature, the ability of religious doctrine
to promote political stability and economic and social prosperity) -
that decision is never without controversy since there may be
other explanations for the alleged efficacy of this evidence.
A second question relates to the decision-making process that
led to the establishment of a religion. Often the establishment of
official religions resulted from the decision of a monarch according
to the principle cuius regio, eius religio (the religion of the King
should be the religion of the kingdom).12 It is not impossible, how-
ever, to have a social contract between free and equal citizens or
their representatives, all members of the same religious commu-
nity, in which the parties decide to establish their own faith as the
only official and true religion to be observed by all members of the
political community, both present and future. The American colo-
nial experience seems to exemplify the possibility of the estab-
lishment of religions by social contract.13
This solution is problematic in that it inevitably encourages
the exercise of state coercion over individual conscience since the
non-adherents, even when not positively coerced to endorse the es-
tablished religion, are negatively coerced to not bring their own
convictions to the sphere of public discourse. This solution also
denies the Lockean principle of separation between the coercive
state and the voluntary church. This idea is based on the notion
12. E.g., Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 289, 308 (2005).
13. E.g., DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 515-527(2003) (describing the manner in which many of the original American colo-
nies became incorporated as covenant communities consisting of like-minded
religious believers seeking to establish a way of life based upon religiously
orthodox ideas).
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that the church is a free and voluntary society;14 the State, how-
ever, which is not chosen by individuals, should use its monopoly
over coercive power only to protect human rights and promote
public goods. Thus, while the individual must be granted the free-
dom to decide whether or not he should join one particular reli-
gious community, he should not be forced to do so by a democratic
decision of the political community, nor should he be forced to for-
sake his own personal religious convictions by democratic decision.
The Lockean separation principle precludes the establishment
of TOTF as the official religion of the Elysian State. In fact, it en-
courages the adoption of an open sphere of public discourse where
persuasive conversation can inform topics concerning religious
doctrine, and where TOTF can be publicly assessed on its merits.
This is not the same as establishing relativism and indifferentism
since it does not do away with the basic theological and epistemo-
logical categories of truth and error; instead it leaves the final de-
termination to the critical assessment of individuals and
communities. 15 Put simply, it avoids placing the coercive power of
the State on either side of the equation.
The fact that the Elysian State should refrain from establish-
ing TOTF as its official religion does not mean the State is totally
forbidden to use TOTF's assumptions as a source of meaning and
value. States are, by themselves, unable to generate the large
amount of foundational, anthropological, aesthetic and ethical ma-
terials and metanorms necessary to put in place political and legal
institutions, and to guide sensitive policy decisions (e.g., abortion,
family, social security, the environment, war and peace). In these
and other matters States must make fundamental decisions on
the basis of metanormative criteria that are exogenous to them.
14. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 19-22.
15. Locke himself illustrates what a society based upon the free exchange
of religious ideas should resemble. Although he readily denounces the teach-
ings of Catholics, Jews and "heathens" as being "false and absurd," he none-
theless assures his largely Protestant audience that religious truth can, and
must, stand and fall on its own epistemological merits:
[T]ruth certainly would do well enough, if she were once left to shift
for herself. [Truth] is not taught by laws, nor has she any need of
force to procure her entrance into the minds of men. But if truth
makes not her way into the understanding by her own light, she will
be the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her.
Id. at 55-6.
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Imagine, for instance, a non-TOTFer, believing in the doctrine of
reincarnation, would like to marry a dog, and seeks permission
from the Elysian State to do so. In this case, the State would make
its decision based largely on the conception of family shared by the
majority of its population - probably members of TOTF. This is
because the State cannot make fundamental decisions on the defi-
nition of the family without relying on some set of aesthetical,
ethical and moral assumptions that determine the limits of cul-
tural permissibility. States will unavoidably rely on the normative
materials generated by existing moral communities, and in a de-
mocracy it should not be a surprise when the State relies more
heavily on those values, principles, goals and interests shared by
the majority of the population, or by those more politically
motivated segments of it. By itself, this is not establishment of a
religion.
ESTABLISHMENT FOR REASONS OF CONVENIENCE
Some of the above considerations suggest that - apart from
the conviction that a given religion is the true religion - there may
be other political, social and cultural reasons why a State may
find it politically convenient to explicitly endorse a particular re-
ligion. In many cases, religious unity has been seen as a guarantee
of national identity, singularity, stability and security. Religious
unity has also provided legitimacy to a ruler, or a dynasty
thereof. 16 The only way to defend religious liberty in these situa-
tions is to argue that religion plays a crucial role in the individual
and collective quest for truth and meaning, and that individual
conscience and integrity cannot be held hostage by political inter-
est and expediency. Religious freedom cannot fall prey to the de-
mands of national history and tradition, since religion concerns
the individual and collective search for basic answers to questions
16. For example, the emperor Constantine's conversion to Christianity
provides historians with one of the most prominent examples of how an es-
tablished religion can solidify the legitimacy of a particular ruler. Constan-
tine's mission to establish Christianity as the official religion of the Roman
Empire was, in large part, facilitated by the manner in which the Christian
religion had successfully "transcended class barriers" and "penetrated all
classes," thereby providing Constantine with a ready-made ecclesiastical es-
tablishment by which he could unite his subjects easily under a unified socio-
religious hierarchy. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 95-6 (Touch-
stone 1995) (1976).
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of origin, meaning and destiny. The question may involve one's re-
lationship to a Supreme Being, which is something very different
from one's relationship with his or her nation. If there are any po-
litical, social and cultural values that can in some way be used to
justify the establishment of a particular religion, these must be
gradually but deliberately reshaped and adjusted so as to accom-
modate the right of individual and collective religious freedom. As
people can and should engage in intercultural dialogue to advance
human rights, so they can and should be free 'to engage in in-
tracultural dialogue to promote the same. The ability to freely and
fully discuss and promote religious doctrine within the limits of
equal freedom of conscience should be a central tenet of both na-
tional and international law.
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF ESTABLISHED MAJORITY RELIGIONS
Another problem presented by established religions such as
TOTF is known as the vicious circle of established majorities. In
many instances political establishments are justified by the fact
that the official religion is the religion of the majority. In reality,
however, many religions become majoritiarian because they were
established in a way that prevented any dissenting and challeng-
ing perspectives from being voiced. 17 Thus the existing establish-
ment is justified as a consequence of majoritarian preference, but
the reality is that the preference is, to a large extent, actually en-
dogenous to the existing establishment. The only way to break
this vicious circle is to enshrine a broad principle of religious free-
dom and disestablish the dominant religious tradition. In the case
of the Elysian State this can and should be done in a way that
promotes the equal freedom of religion for both TOTFers and non-
TOTFers, yet recognizes the role that TOTF has played, and still
plays, in shaping the political, legal and cultural life of the major-
ity. There is significant empirical evidence showing that when
there is a broad freedom of religion in a given society there is a
natural tendency for religious pluralism to emerge, even within
17. Professor Edward Eberle provides an insightful analysis into the
manner in which some of the original colonial communities in America im-
posed mandatory church attendance upon all inhabitants in order to stifle
public dissent and the dissemination of heterodox ideas. Eberle, supra note
12, at 319-20.
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existing dominant traditions.18 Once the legal preconditions are in
place this can develop as a slow and gradual process, without do-
ing violence to the feelings, history and tradition of the political
community. In general, it is not hard to uncover evidence that the
establishment of a given religion is much more a function of politi-
cal and social conditions than of any convincing capacity for a
State to discern spiritual truth, or a genuine concern, on its part,
for the eternal salvation of its citizens.
PATERNALISM, RESENTMENT AND TENSION
The kind of establishment promoted by the Elysian State is
paternalistic and treats its non-TOTF citizens as mentally and
spiritually handicapped. By privatizing the religious activity of
non-TOTFers the State publicly questions their moral and ra-
tional competence, as well as their capacity to pursue truth and
knowledge, and to provide alternative perspectives and insights to
public discourse.' 9 Furthermore, public endorsement of TOTF puts
pressure on non-TOTFers to conform and convert for social con-
venience without any further assurance of eternal salvation. Not
only is this hypocrisy, but non-TOTFers are subjected to humilia-
tion and suffering, and are likely to have their self-esteem and
18. An example of this important principle can be found within the writ-
ings of Alexis DeTocqueville. While observing the plight of American Catholic
immigrants living within predominantly Protestant localities, DeTocqueville
credits the separation of church and state within American jurisprudence for
the ability of Catholics to profess their faith publicly without fear of govern-
ment reprisals: "I found that all of these men differed among themselves only
in details [of religious worship]; but all attributed the peaceful dominion that
religion exercises in their country principally to the complete separation of
church and state." ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282-83
(Harvey C. Mansfield et. al. eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835).
19. See THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), reprinted in THOMAS
PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMON SENSE, & OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 137
(Mark Phillip ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998):
Who, then, art thou, vain dust and ashes! by whatever thou art
called, whether a King, a Bishop, a Church or a State, a Parliament
or anything else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the
soul of man and its Maker? Mind thine own concerns. If he believes
not as thou believest, it is a proof that thou believest not as he
believeth, and there is no earthly power [that] can determine
between you.
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sense of self-respect negatively affected. 20
Thus the establishment of TOFT has demoralizing costs for
non-TOTFers that are passed to the whole political community.
Resentment builds among this second-class citizenry with nega-
tive externalities that can affect the whole Elysian State. If the
number of non-TOTFers increases significantly, chances are that
tensions between TOTFers and non-TOTFers will increase as well.
Prevented from voicing their views in the sphere of public dis-
course, there is an incentive for non-TOTFers to look for alterna-
tive means and alternative channels to promote political change.
That is why those of us who value human dignity and fundamen-
tal rights should promote normative change in the Elysian State.
20. See BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE & A
POLITICAL TREATISE 258 (R.H.M. Elwes trans., Dover 1951) (1670):
However unlimited , therefore, the power of a sovereign may be ... it
can never prevent men from forming judgments according to their
intellect .... Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom of
judgment and feeling; since every man is by indefeasible natural
right the master of his own thoughts, it follows that men thinking in
diverse and contradictory fashions, cannot, without disastorous re-
sults, be compelled to speak only according to the dictates of the su-
preme power .... Men's common failing is to confide their plans to
others, though there be need for secrecy, so that a government would
be most harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying
and teaching what he thought.
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